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Sovereign credit ratings play an important part in determining countries’ access to international 
capital markets and the terms of that access. In principle, there is no reason to expect that 
sovereign credit ratings should systematically predict currency crises. In practice, however, in 
emerging market economies there is a strong link between currency crises and default. Hence if 
credit ratings are forward-looking and currency crises in emerging market economies are linked 
to defaults, it follows that downgrades in credit ratings should systematically precede currency 
crises. This article presents results suggesting that sovereign credit ratings systematically fail to 
predict currency crises but do considerably better in predicting defaults. Downgrades in credit 
ratings usually follow currency crises, possibly suggesting that currency instability increases the 
risk of default. 
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Sovereign credit ratings play an important part in determining countries’ access to 
international capital markets and the terms of that access. As more countries are added to the list 
of rated sovereigns, the information content of ratings becomes even more important.1 Credit 
ratings have been shown to have a significant impact on the yield spreads of sovereign bonds.2 
Indeed, sovereign credit ratings are taken as summary measures of the likelihood that a country 
will default. Hence it is hardly surprising that the countries with the lowest ratings are those that 
are unable to borrow from international capital markets and dependent on official loans from 
multilateral institutions or governments. In a cross-sectional setting sovereign credit ratings do 
well in distinguishing across borrowers. 
Developed countries take access to international capital markets for granted. At the other 
end of the spectrum many low-income countries, mired in debt, have no access to international 
lending even under relatively favorable states of nature.3 And for emerging market economies 
access to international capital markets is precarious and highly variable over time. It is for these 
economies that sovereign credit ratings are most critical.  
                                                 
 1 To cite a recent example, Standard and Poor’s added Guatemala to the list of rated sovereigns 
in November 2001. 
 2 See, for example, Larraín, Reisen, and von Maltzan (1997), who find evidence that ratings 
“Granger cause” the yield spreads of sovereign bonds. 
 3 Favorable states of nature include both shocks that are idiosyncratic to a country, such as an 
increase in its terms of trade, and common shocks, such as a decline in world interest rates. 
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In principle, there is no reason to expect that sovereign credit ratings should 
systematically predict currency or banking crises. After all, developed countries have had their 
share of currency crises (such as the 1992–93 Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in France and the 
United Kingdom), banking crises (such as that in Japan in the 1990s and the savings and loan 
crisis in the United States in the early 1980s), and simultaneous currency and banking crises 
(such as the twin crises in the Nordic countries in the  early 1990s and in Spain in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.  These crises did not lead to systematic markdowns in credit ratings. 
In practice, however, in emerging market economies there is a strong link between 
currency crises and default.4 Without the colossal bailout packages put together by the 
international community, there is little doubt that the currency crises in Mexico, the Republic of 
Korea, Thailand, and, more recently, Turkey would all have produced a sovereign debt default.5 
Hence if credit ratings are forward-looking and currency crises in emerging market economies 
are linked to defaults, it follows that downgrades should systematically precede currency crises. 
It is this temporal (rather than cross-sectional) behavior of credit ratings that this article 
investigates. 
Contrary to logic, recent anecdotal evidence suggests that downgrades in credit ratings 
have not preceded financial crises. Downgrades appear to have followed, not preceded, the crises 
                                                 
 4 Furthermore, some of the indicators useful in predicting currency crises are also useful in 
predicting debt crises. See Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001). 
 5 Even if the government itself has little outstanding debt, history has shown that, time after 
time, governments assume private sector debt during currency crises. 
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in Asia in 1997 (table 1). A natural question then is whether this failure by the rating agencies to 
anticipate debt servicing difficulties is systematic. Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000) 
examine the links between currency and banking crises and changes in sovereign credit ratings 
by Institutional Investor and Moody’s for 20 countries. They find mixed evidence on the ability 
of the rating agencies to anticipate financial crises. Neither rating agency predicted banking 
crises, but there is evidence that the Moody’s sovereign ratings have some (very low) predictive 
power for currency crises. 
This article casts a wider net, examining the links among crises, default, and rating 
changes for 46–62 economies, depending on the rating agency. It also extends the analysis to 
Standard and Poor’s sovereign ratings and different approaches to dating the currency crises.  
I. CRISES, DEFAULT, AND THE AFTERMATH 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) have suggested that one reason that emerging market 
economies may fear devaluations (or large depreciations) is that the devaluations are associated 
with a loss of access to international credit, which in turn is associated with severe recessions.6 
To examine this issue, the article begins by assessing the temporal links between episodes of 
sovereign default and currency crises. In response to the recent anecdotal evidence suggesting 
that downward adjustments in sovereign credit ratings have come after currency crises were well 
under way, it also reviews the behavior of credit ratings in the aftermath of crises. And it 
                                                 
 6 Calvo and Reinhart (2000) present evidence that the recessions following devaluations are 
deeper in emerging market economies than in developed economies. 
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examines the extent to which currency crises lead to a reassessment of the risk of sovereign 
default and whether distinct patterns emerge for developed and emerging market economies. 
Data and Definitions 
The analysis covers the sovereign credit ratings issued by Institutional Investor, Moody’s 
Investors Service, and Standard and Poor’s. The Institutional Investor sample begins in 1979 and 
runs through 1999. The panels for the Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings are unbalanced 
(that is, they do not have the same number of observations for all economies). 
The Institutional Investor ratings run from 0 (least creditworthy) to 100 (most 
creditworthy). The ratings are reported twice a year and changed frequently. Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s use multiple letters to rate a sovereign’s creditworthiness. For the purposes 
of the analysis the letter ratings are mapped into 17 categories, with 16 corresponding to the 
highest rating and 0 to the lowest (for an illustration see table 2).7 Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s may change their ratings at any time (though they do so much less often than Institutional 
Investor), so the samples for these rating agencies include, for each economy, the months in 
which any rating changes took place.  
With 62 economies, the Institutional Investor sample is the largest (table 3). The 
Standard and Poor’s sample is the smallest, with 46 economies, but is nonetheless more than 
twice the size of the 20-country sample used by Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000). The 
                                                 
 7 This approach follows the procedure adopted in Cantor and Packer (1996a, b). 
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sample for the analysis of the links between currency crises and default includes 58 economies 
and spans the period 1970–99.  
Methodological Issues 
To assess the interaction among currency crises, default, and sovereign credit ratings, the 
crises need to be dated. Two indexes of currency crises are constructed, to assess whether the 
results are sensitive to the definition of crises used. The first index is that used by Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) for 20 countries—but now extended to the larger sample. The second is the 
definition of crises employed by Frankel and Rose (1996).8  
Kaminsky and Reinhart’s (1999) crisis index, (KR), I, is a weighted average of the rate of 
change of the exchange rate, Δe/e, and the rate of change of reserves, ΔR/R, with weights such 
that the two components of the index have equal sample volatilities: 
(1) I = (Δe/e) – (σe/σR)*(ΔR/R),  
where σe is the standard deviation of the rate of change of the exchange rate and σR is the 
standard deviation of the rate of change of reserves. Since changes in the exchange rate enter 
with a positive weight and changes in reserves with a negative weight, readings of this index that 
are three standard deviations or more above the mean are catalogued as crises. 
Construction of the index is modified for economies in the sample that have experienced 
hyperinflation. While a 100 percent devaluation may be traumatic for a country with low to 
                                                 
 8 An earlier version of this article included a modified version of Frankel and Rose’s index that 
dates “milder” crises.  Reinhart (2002). 
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moderate inflation, a devaluation of that size is common during episodes of hyperinflation. For 
countries that have had such an episode, a single index would miss sizable devaluations and 
reserve losses in the periods of moderate inflation, since the high-inflation episode distorts the 
historical mean. To avoid this, the sample economies are sorted into two groups according to 
whether the inflation rate in the previous six months exceeded 150 percent, and an index is then 
constructed for each subsample.9 As earlier studies (see Frankel and Rose, 1996) have noted, the 
dates of crises obtained using this method map well onto the dates obtained when crises are 
defined exclusively on the basis of events, such as the closing of the exchange markets or a 
change in the exchange rate regime. 
The Frankel and Rose (FR) definition of a currency crisis is a 25 percent or greater 
devaluation in a given month that is also at least 10 percent greater than the devaluation in the 
preceding month (Frankel and Rose 1996).10 
Episodes of default are dated using Beers and Bhatia (1999) who provide dates of default 
from 1824 to 1999 (the analysis here focuses on 1970–99); Beim and Calomiris (2001); the 
World Bank’s Global Development Finance (various years); and the dates of debt crises 
                                                 
 9 Similar results are obtained by using significant departures in inflation from 6-month and 12-
month moving averages. 
 10 The modified FR index (MFR) used in the earlier version of this article (Reinhart, 2002) 
classifies as a crisis a devaluation in a given month that is 20 percent or greater and at least 5 
percent greater than the devaluation in the preceding month. 
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provided by Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001).11 In some cases these sources pinpoint the 
exact month in which a default was announced. The sample includes defaults on both foreign 
currency bank debt and foreign currency bond debt but not on local currency instruments. And it 
includes defaults for both rated and unrated sovereigns. 
A Sketch of the Signals Approach 
The “signals” approach developed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) is used to compare 
the performance of the ratings—and of some of the economic indicators on which rating 
agencies focus—with the performance of some of the other (and better) predictors of financial 
crises. In a nutshell, the signals approach involves a set of possible outcomes, as presented in the 
following two-by-two matrix:12 
 
 
 
 
 
Crisis occurs in the following 24 No crisis occurs in the following 
                                                 
 11 Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) classify an observation as a debt crisis if either or both of 
the following conditions occur: there are arrears of principal or interest on external obligations to 
commercial creditors (banks or bondholders) exceeding 5 percent of total commercial debt 
outstanding, or there is a rescheduling or debt restructuring agreement with commercial creditors 
as listed in the World Bank’s Global Development Finance. 
 12 For a more detailed description of the signals approach see Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 
(1998) and Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000). 
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months 24 months 
 
Signal  
 
A 
 
B 
 
No signal 
 
C 
 
D 
 
A perfect indicator would have entries only in cells A and D. 
This matrix permits the definition of several useful concepts employed to evaluate the 
performance of each indicator. If no information were available on the performance of the 
indicators, it would still be possible to calculate, for a given sample, the unconditional 
probability of crisis: 
(2) P(C) = (A + C)/(A + B + C + D).    
If an indicator sends a signal and that indicator has a reliable track record, the probability of a 
crisis, conditional on a signal, P(C⏐S), can be expected to be greater than the unconditional 
probability where 
(3) P(C⏐S) = A/(A + B).  
Formally, 
(4) P(C⏐S) – P(C) > 0.  
The intuition is clear: if the indicator is not “noisy” (prone to sending false alarms), there will be 
relatively few entries in cell B, and P(C⏐S) ≈ 1. This is one of the criteria used to rank the 
indicators. The noise-to-signal ratio can be defined as 
(5) N/S = [B/(B + D)]/[A/(A + C)].  
If an indicator has a track record of relatively few false alarms, this may mean that the 
indicator issues signals relatively rarely and that there is a danger that it misses crises altogether 
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(that is, that it does not signal before a crisis). Hence the proportion of crises accurately signaled 
is also calculated for each indicator: 
(6) PC = C/(A + C).   
For credit ratings, a downgrade in the 24 months before a crisis would be considered a 
signal. 
Currency Crises and Default: The Links 
To analyze the interaction between defaults and currency crises, the two-by-two matrix 
can be recast as follows if defaults signal currency crises: 
 
 
 
 
Currency crisis occurs in the 
following 24 months 
 
No currency crisis occurs in the 
following 24 months 
 
Default  
 
A 
 
B 
 
No default 
 
C 
 
D 
 
If the converse is true, the matrix can be recast in this way: 
 
 
 
 
Default occurs in the following 
24 months 
 
No default occurs in the following 
24 months 
 
Currency crisis  
 
A 
 
B 
 
No currency crisis 
 
C 
 
D 
 
To simply look at the joint occurrence of default and currency crises, the 24-month window 
would be extended so that it is two-sided around the default date. 
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The sample for the analysis of the links between defaults and currency crises includes 
113 defaults and 151 currency crises, 135 of them in emerging market economies. The 
unconditional probability of defaulting is 13.3 percent if developed economies (for which the 
probability of default is zero) are excluded from the sample (table 4).13 The unconditional 
probability of a currency crisis is about 17 percent. This probability changes little when 
developed economies are excluded from the sample, highlighting the fact that the key difference 
between developed and emerging market economies is debt problems—although as we shall see 
debt problems are tightly linked to currency problems in emerging market economies. The 
probability of having a currency crisis within 24 months of defaulting (with the crisis either 
before or after the default) is about 84 percent. Since defaults are somewhat rarer than currency 
crises, the probability of having a default within 24 months of a currency crisis is lower: about 
58 percent for the entire sample and 66 percent for emerging market economies. This second 
subset is the relevant group, since it accounts for all the episodes of default in the sample. This 
exercise points to the strong association between debt events and currency crises in emerging 
market economies.  
What temporal pattern do the results reveal? The probability of having a currency crisis 
conditional on having defaulted is about 69 percent, while the probability of defaulting 
                                                 
 13 This is the probability of a new default, not the probability of being in a state of default, 
which is larger. For example, Sierra Leone was in default on its foreign currency bank debt 
during 1983–84 and 1986–95. This is treated as a single episode of default beginning in 1983, 
just as in Beim and Calomiris (2001). 
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conditional on having had a currency crisis is somewhat lower, at around 46 percent for 
emerging market economies. What inference is to be drawn from these results? Not so much that 
there is any obvious causal pattern—although currency crises conditional on having defaulted 
are more common—but that currency crises are more frequent and in about half the cases (even 
in emerging market economies) do not necessarily lead to default. Indeed, this stylized fact may 
help explain why credit ratings do poorly in predicting currency crises, an issue taken up later. 
Of course, as discussed, there are a few cases in the sample in which a currency crisis would 
have precipitated a default in the absence of a major intervention by the financial community. 
Sovereign Credit Ratings in the Aftermath of Crises 
Further evidence that devaluations (or large depreciations) are followed more often than 
not by debt servicing difficulties can be gleaned from studying the behavior of sovereign credit 
ratings in the aftermath of such events. Results from analysis of Institutional Investor ratings 
around currency crises show no significant difference between developed and emerging market 
economies in the probability of a downgrade (or multiple downgrades) following a currency 
crisis (table 5). But this is where the similarities between the two groups of economies end. The 
average rating for emerging market economies at the time of a crisis is 37.6, slightly less than 
half the average score for developed countries. This suggests, of course, that even in the absence 
of a crisis, access to international lending is far from even for the two groups. Moreover, that 
vast gap widens further in the aftermath of devaluations associated with currency crises. In the 
12 months following a currency crisis, the sovereign rating index for emerging market 
economies falls by 10.8 percent on average, a downgrade about five times that for developed 
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economies. The difference between the postcrisis downgrades for emerging market and 
developed economies is significant at standard confidence levels.  
A comparable exercise performed for the Moody’s ratings shows an even greater gulf 
between emerging market and developed economies. Like the Institutional Investor ratings, the 
Moody’s ratings at the outset of a currency crisis are significantly lower for emerging market 
economies—on average, about a third that for developed economies (table 6). And again, the 
downgrade for emerging market economies (about 9 percent) is far greater than that for 
developed economies (less than 1 percent). But the probability of a downgrade—and the 
probability of multiple downgrades—in the 12 months following a crisis are significantly higher 
for emerging market economies in the case of Moody’s sovereign ratings. Consistent with the 
findings on the interaction between defaults and currency crises, the behavior of sovereign credit 
ratings in the aftermath of currency crises suggests that such crises increase the probability of 
default—but not necessarily that currency crises equal default. 
A useful analysis complementing the preceding one examines whether knowing that there 
was a currency crisis indeed helps to predict downgrades in sovereign credit ratings for emerging 
market and developed economies. For the Institutional Investor sample, for which there is a 
continuous time series, the six-month change in the credit rating index is regressed on a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 when there was a crisis six months earlier, and 0 otherwise. The 
method of estimation is generalized least squares, correcting for both generalized forms of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the residuals. For the Moody’s sample the dependent 
variable is the three-month change in the rating, and the explanatory variable is the dummy 
variable for currency crises three months earlier. This specification makes it possible to 
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determine more precisely whether downgrades follow rapidly after crises occur. The dependent 
variable assumes the value –1 (if there was a downgrade), 0 (no change), or 1 (an upgrade). The 
parameters of interest are estimated using an ordered probit technique that permits correction for 
heteroskedastic disturbances. 
The results of the estimation show that for emerging market economies, currency crises 
help predict downgrades regardless of which rating index is used (table 7). For developed 
economies, however, there is no conclusive evidence that ratings respond to currency crises in a 
systematic and significant way, at least after 1970. This finding is perfectly consistent with the 
probability assessment showing no links between currency crises and default. For emerging 
market economies the coefficients are significant at standard confidence levels, but the marginal 
predictive contribution of currency crises to predicting default remains small. For example, a 
currency crisis increases the likelihood of a downgrade in the Moody’s ratings by 5 percent. The 
results from this exercise reinforce the view that large devaluations or depreciations in emerging 
market economies increase the likelihood of default, as evidenced by the downgrades in 
sovereign ratings. That the predictive ability of currency crises is so low suggests that other 
economic fundamentals are important in explaining changes in sovereign credit ratings (see 
Cantor and Packer 1996a, b). 
The results are also consistent with the conclusions of Larraín, Reisen, and von Maltzan 
(1997), who find evidence of two-way causality between sovereign ratings and market spreads. 
Hence not only do international capital markets react to changes in the ratings, but the ratings 
systematically react (with a lag) to market conditions, as reflected in the yield spreads of 
sovereign bonds.  
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III. SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS BEFORE CRISES 
The analysis has shown that there is a strong connection between currency crises and 
default in emerging market economies—about 84 percent of defaults in these economies are 
associated with a currency crisis in the months before or after the default. It has also shown that 
slightly more than half the currency crises in emerging market economies are not linked with a 
subsequent default. Nonetheless, it is evident from the preceding exercise that currency crises do 
affect the probability of default, as sovereign credit ratings for emerging market economies are 
systematically downgraded after currency crises. Hence while it is critical to assess how well the 
ratings predict default, it is also useful to assess how well changes in sovereign credit ratings 
predict crises, given the close connection between the two in emerging market economies.  
Probit estimation is used to assess the predictive ability of ratings, with the Institutional 
Investor, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s ratings as regressors for currency crises and 
defaults. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for currency crises; the independent 
variable is the 12-month change in the credit rating lagged one year. A comparable exercise is 
performed for episodes of default. Alternative specifications, such as the 6-month change in the 
credit rating lagged 6 months, 18 months, and 24 months, are also considered.14 The method of 
estimation corrects for serial correlation and for heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 
                                                 
 14 The alternative time horizons, ranging from 6-month changes to 18- and 24- month changes at 
a variety of lag lengths, produce very similar results. A subset of these results are reported in 
Reinhart (2002), the rest are available from the author. 
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The basic premise underpinning the simple postulated model is as follows. If the credit 
rating agencies use all available information on the economic “fundamentals” to form their rating 
decisions, then credit ratings should help predict defaults and may (or may not) predict currency 
crises—if the macroeconomic indicators on which the ratings are based have some predictive 
power. Moreover, the simple model should not be misspecified—that is, other indicators should 
not be statistically significant, since that information would presumably already be reflected in 
the ratings. Hence the state of the macroeconomic fundamentals would be captured in a single 
indicator: the ratings. 
Recent studies that have examined the determinants of credit ratings provide support for 
the basic premise that ratings are significantly linked with certain economic fundamentals (see 
Lee 1993 and Cantor and Packer 1996a). For example, Cantor and Packer (1996a) find that per 
capita GDP, inflation, external debt, and indicators of default history and economic development 
are all significant determinants of sovereign ratings.  
In the results of the probit estimation for Institutional Investor ratings, the coefficients of 
the credit ratings have the expected negative sign for any of the two definitions of currency 
crises—that is, an upgrade reduces the probability of a crisis (table 8). But for the two definitions 
of currency crises the coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level.  Moreover, as in (Reinhart 
2002) , this result is not robust to other specifications. For example, if the 6-month change in the 
credit rating 6 months before the crisis is used as a regressor, none of the coefficients is 
statistically significant. For defaults, the coefficients of the Institutional Investor ratings are 
significant—but only at the 10 percent confidence level. 
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For the Moody’s sample the coefficients on the ratings variable are statistically 
insignificant for both the definitions of currency crises, and for the FR definition the coefficient 
has the wrong sign (table 9). Hence for this larger, 48-country sample the Goldstein, Kaminsky, 
and Reinhart (2000) results do not hold.15 Interestingly, for defaults, the Institutional Investor 
ratings are significant at the 5 percent confidence level. If the potential cases of default in the 
1990s (the countries that received massive bailout packages, without which default would have 
been certain) are included, however, ratings are significant only at the 10 percent level and very 
sensitive to the lag structure used.  
The results for the Standard and Poor’s sample are in line with those for the Moody’s 
sample (table 10). Regardless of the definition of crises or specification of lag structure used, 
none of the coefficients on the changes in credit rating is statistically significant at standard 
confidence levels. Moreover, the coefficients often have the wrong sign for the dates of crises, 
though they are much better for the dates of default.16 
These results appear to be at odds with those of Larraín, Reisen, and von Maltzan (1997), 
who find evidence that ratings “cause” interest rate spreads. The interpretation here, however, is 
                                                 
 15 For the Moody’s sovereign ratings Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000) had found a 
statistically significant coefficient for their 20-country sample. Even so, the marginal 
contribution of the ratings variable was very small. 
 16 As for the Moody’s sample, the results for the Standard and Poor’s sample are sensitive to the 
inclusion of potential cases of default and to the lag structure used (that is, the predictive 
performance was much worse with longer lead times for the ratings). 
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that while ratings may systematically lead yield spreads Larraín, Reisen, and von Maltzan 
present evidence of two-way causality), yield spreads are poor predictors of crises but better 
predictors of default. The reason is that, as shown, not all currency crises lead to default. Hence 
the inability of ratings to predict currency crises is not inconsistent with their ability to influence 
spreads.  
Sovereign Credit Ratings and Macroeconomic Indicators of Crises 
A comparison of the performance of credit ratings, and of some of the economic 
indicators on which rating agencies focus, with the performance of some of the better predictors 
of financial crises produces results underscoring the preceding ones. Performance is assessed on 
the basis of the basic descriptive statistics used in the signals approach to gauge an indicator’s 
ability to predict crises: the noise-to-signal ratio, the percentage of crises accurately called, and 
the marginal predictive power (the difference between the conditional and unconditional 
probabilities). The basic story that emerges is that the Institutional Investor credit ratings 
perform much worse in predicting both currency and banking crises than do the better indicators 
of economic fundamentals (table 11). For the credit ratings the noise-to-signal ratio is higher 
than one for both types of crises, suggesting a similar incidence of good signals and false alarms. 
Hence, not surprisingly, the marginal contribution to predicting a crisis is small relative to that of 
the top indicators; for banking crises the marginal contribution is nil. Moreover, the credit 
ratings call a much smaller percentage of crises than do the top indicators. Indeed, the 
Institutional Investor ratings compare unfavorably with even the worst indicators (see Goldstein, 
Kaminsky, and Reinhart 2000 for details). The results for the Institutional Investor ratings for the 
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larger sample considered here are even worse than those shown in Goldstein, Kaminsky, and 
Reinhart (2000). 
Why Don’t Sovereign Credit Ratings Do Better in Predicting Financial Distress? 
Financial crises are generally difficult to predict—witness the poor performance of 
international interest rate spreads and currency forecasts.17 Moreover, while the overwhelming 
majority of defaults in the sample are associated with currency crises, the converse is not true. 
The results presented here offer a tentative (though partial) answer to the question of why 
sovereign credit ratings don’t do better in predicting financial distress: rating agencies appear to 
have focused on a set of fundamentals that are not the most reliable in predicting currency crises. 
For example, they have given much weight to the debt-to-export ratio, yet this indicator has 
tended to be a poor predictor of financial stress (see table 11). As shown in Reinhart (2002), 
rating agencies have attached little weight to indicators of liquidity, currency misalignments, and 
asset price behavior, which are more reliable leading indicators of the kind of financial stress that 
can lead to both currency crises and default. 
Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) present evidence that liquidity indicators, such as 
short-term debt and debt repayments due, perform particularly well in explaining subsequent 
debt servicing difficulties. Openness and measures of currency overvaluation score high marks 
in their study. 
                                                 
 17 See Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) on the performance of interest rate spreads, and 
Goldfajn and Valdés (1998) on the performance of currency forecasts. 
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V. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This article has addressed several questions. What is the interaction between currency 
crises and defaults? The overwhelming majority of the defaults (84 percent) in emerging market 
economies in the sample are associated with currency crises. But the converse is not true—only 
slightly less than half the currency crises in such economies are linked to default. For developed 
economies there is no evidence of any connection between currency crashes and default. 
How do credit ratings behave following a currency crisis? And are there important 
differences between developed and emerging market economies in the behavior of ratings? 
There is evidence that sovereign credit ratings tend to be reactive, particularly those for 
emerging market economies. And both the probability and the size of a downgrade are 
significantly greater for emerging market economies. Taken together, these findings point to a 
procyclicality in the ratings. Perhaps a more instructive interpretation, however, is that currency 
crises in emerging market economies increase the likelihood of a default. The economic intuition 
is straightforward. Much of the debt of emerging market economies is denominated in dollars, so 
devaluations can have significant balance sheet effects. Moreover, most of the empirical 
evidence suggests that devaluations are contractionary. Calvo and Reinhart (2000), for example, 
ask how the differences between developed and emerging market economies in access to 
international capital markets influence the outcomes of a currency crisis, particularly with 
respect to output. They present evidence that in emerging market economies devaluations (or 
large depreciations) are contractionary, with the adjustments in the current and capital accounts 
far more acute and abrupt. Hence currency crises often become credit crises as sovereign credit 
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ratings collapse following the currency collapse and the economy loses access to international 
credit. 
Do sovereign credit ratings systematically help to predict currency crises and default? 
The results of the empirical tests presented here suggest that sovereign credit ratings 
systematically fail to predict currency crises but do considerably better in predicting defaults. 
Even so, ratings would not have predicted the nearly certain defaults that would have occurred in 
several recent crises had the international community not provided large-scale bailouts. These 
results appear to be robust across different definitions of crises, model specifications, and 
approaches.  
Finally, why are sovereign ratings such poor predictors of currency crises? Financial 
crises are generally difficult to predict; international interest rate spreads and currency forecasts 
also perform poorly in predicting such crises. Yet ratings do better in predicting defaults than 
they do in predicting currency crises, although these results are less robust across different model 
specifications. Nonetheless, the results presented here suggest that rating agencies would do well 
to incorporate many indicators of vulnerability that have received high marks from the literature 
on the antecedents of currency crises. For example, while rating agencies have given much 
weight to debt-to-export ratios, which have proved to be poor predictors of financial stress, they 
have given little to indicators of liquidity, currency misalignments, and asset price behavior. 
Many of these indicators have been shown to be useful in predicting not only currency crises but 
also debt crises (Detragiache and Spilimbergo 2001). As noted, much can be learned about the 
antecedents and incidence of default from the literature on currency crises. This should not come 
as a surprise since, after all, while about one half of the currency crises are not associated with 
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default--an equal share of currency crises are linked, in one way or another, to a sovereign 
default incident.  
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Table 1. Performance of Rating Agencies before the Asian Crisis: Long-Term Debt Ratings, 
1996–97 
 
 
Rating 
agency and 
country 
 
 
 
 January 15, 1996 
 
 December 2, 1996 
 
 June 24, 1997 
 
 December 12, 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
Rating 
 
Outlook 
 
Rating  
 
Outlook 
 
Rating 
 
Outlook 
 
Rating 
 
Outlook 
 
Moody’s foreign currency debt 
 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
Baa3 
 
 
 
Baa3 
 
 
 
Baa3 
 
 
 
Baa3 
 
 
 
Korea, Rep. 
of 
 
 
 
A1 
 
 
 
A1 
 
Stable 
 
 
 
 
 
Baa2 
 
Negativ
e 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
A1 
 
 
 
A1 
 
 
 
A1 
 
 
 
A1 
 
 
 
Mexico 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Philippines 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Ba2 
 
 
 
Thailand 
 
 
 
A2 
 
 
 
A2 
 
 
 
A2 
 
 
 
Baa1 
 
Negativ
e 
 
Standard and Poor’s [please repeat dates of ratings in this row, since they are not all the same as those above] 
 
 October 1997 
 
Indonesia 
 
Foreign currency 
debt 
 
BBB 
 
Stable 
 
BBB 
 
Stable 
 
BBB 
 
Stable 
 
BBB 
 
Negativ
e 
 
 
 
Domestic currency 
debt 
 
 
 
 
 
A+ 
 
 
 
A+ 
 
 
 
A– 
 
Negativ
e 
 
Korea, Rep. 
of 
 
Foreign currency 
debt 
 
AA– 
 
Stable 
 
AA– 
 
Stable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domestic currency 
debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
Foreign currency 
debt 
 
A+ 
 
Stable 
 
A+ 
 
Stable 
 
A+ 
 
Positive 
 
A+ 
 
Negativ
e 
 
 
 
Domestic currency 
debt 
 
AA+ 
 
 
 
AA+ 
 
 
 
AA+ 
 
 
 
AA+ 
 
Negativ
e 
 
Mexico 
 
Foreign currency 
debt 
 
BB 
 
Negative 
 
BB 
 
 
 
 
BB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domestic currency 
debt 
 
BBB+ 
 
 
 
BBB+ 
 
Stable 
 
BBB+ 
 
Positive 
 
 
 
 
 
Philippines 
 
Foreign currency 
debt 
 
BB 
 
Positive 
 
BB 
 
Positive 
 
BB+ 
 
Positive 
 
BB+ 
 
Stable 
 
 
 
Domestic currency 
debt 
 
BBB+ 
 
 
 
BBB+ 
 
 
 
A– 
 
 
 
A– 
 
Stable 
 
Thailand 
 
Foreign currency 
debt 
 
A 
 
Stable 
 
A 
 
Stable 
 
A 
 
Stable 
 
BBB 
 
Negativ
e 
 
 
 
Domestic currency 
debt 
 
 
 
 
 
AA 
 
 
 
AA 
 
 
 
A 
 
Negativ
e 
 
 26 
Note: The rating system for Moody’s is as follows (from highest to lowest): Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, 
A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3, Ba1, Ba2, Ba3. The rating system for Standard and Poor’s is as 
follows (from highest to lowest): AAA, AA+, AA, AA–, A+, A, A–, BBB+, BBB, BBB–, BB+, 
BB, BB–. 
Source: Radelet and Sachs 1998. 
Note: Blank cells denote no action or change at that time. 
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Table 2. Scale for Moody's Foreign Currency Debt Rating 
  
Rating 
 
 
Assigned value 
 
 Aaa 
 
16  
Aa1 
 
15  
Aa2 
 
14  
Aa3 
 
13  
A1 
 
12  
A2 
 
11  
A3 
 
10  
Baa1 
 
9  
Baa2 
 
8  
Baa3 
 
7  
Ba1 
 
6  
Ba2 
 
5  
Ba3 
 
4  
B1 
 
3  
B2 
 
2  
B3 
 
1  
C 
 
0 
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from Moody’s. 
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Table 3. The Samples 
 
 
Institutional Investors: biannual observations for 62 economies, 1979–99 
 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Arab Republic of Egypt, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong (China), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, United States, 
Uruguay, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, and Zimbabwe 
 
Moody’s Investors Service: monthly observations for 48 economies, unbalanced panel, 1979-
99 
 
Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Arab Republic of Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, 
Greece, Hong Kong (China), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, and República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela 
 
Standard and Poor’s: monthly observations for 46 economies, unbalanced panel, 1979-99 
 
Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Arab Republic of Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Hong 
Kong (China), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Thailand, Turkey, United States, and Uruguay  
 
Sample for the interaction between currency crises and defaults: 58 economies, 1970–99, 151 
currency crises, 113 defaults 
 
Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, 
Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Arab Republic of Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, 
Sudan, Sweden, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
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Table 4. The Twin D’s: Devaluation and Default, 1970–99 
(percent) 
 
Probability 
 
All sample economies
 
Emerging market 
economies only 
 
Unconditional probability of a default 
occurring in the next 24 months 
 
12.0a 
 
13.3 
 
Unconditional probability of a currency crisis 
occurring in the next 24 months 
 
17.3 
 
16.9 
 
Probability of a currency crisis occurring 
within 24 months before or after a default 
 
84.0b 
 
84.0b 
 
Probability of a default occurring within 24 
months before or after a currency crisis 
 
57.5 
 
65.7 
 
Probability of a currency crisis occurring 
within 24 months of having defaulted 
 
69.3 
 
69.3 
 
Probability of a default occurring within 24 
months of having had a currency crisis 
 
39.4 
 
46.0 
 
a. The probability of default for the developed economies in the sample is zero. 
b. The probabilities for the entire sample and the subset of emerging market economies are the 
same because while developed economies had currency crises, none defaulted within the sample 
period. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 5. Probability and Size of Downgrades in Institutional Investor Sovereign Credit Ratings 
around Currency Crises, 1979–99 
 
 
 
 
Probability  
(percent) 
 
 
 
Of downgrade in the 
6 months following 
the crisis 
 
Of downgrade in the 
12 months following 
the crisis
 
Of more than one 
downgrade in the 12 
months following the crisis
 
Emerging 
market 
economies 
 
39.0
 
79.3
 
31.7
 
Developed 
economies 
 
38.4
 
73.1
 
30.8
 
Difference 
 
0.6
 
6.2
 
0.9
 
 
 
Index level  
 
 
 
 
At time of crisis 
 
In the next 6 months 
 
12 months later
 
Emerging 
market 
economies 
 
37.6
 
36.0
 
33.5
 
Developed 
economies 
 
76.0
 
74.9
 
74.5
 
Difference 
 
–38.4**
 
–38.9**
 
–41.0**
 
 
 
Size of downgrade  
(percentage change)  
 
 
 
In the 6 months 
following the crisis 
 
In the next 6 months
 
In the 12 months following 
the crisis
 
Emerging 
market 
economies 
 
4.3
 
6.9
 
10.9
 
Developed 
economies 
 
1.4
 
0.5
 
1.9
 
Difference 
 
2.8*
 
6.4**
 
8.9**
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* Significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Source: Calvo and Reinhart 2000; author’s calculations. 
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Table 6. Probability and Size of Downgrades in Moody’s Sovereign Credit Ratings around 
Currency Crises, 1979–99 
 
 
 
 
Probability 
(percent) 
 
 
 
Of downgrade in the 
6 months following 
the crisis  
 
Of downgrade in the 
12 months following 
the crisis 
 
Of more than one 
downgrade in the 12 
months following the crisis 
 
Emerging 
market 
economies 
 
20.0 
 
26.7 
 
6.7 
 
Developed 
economies 
 
10.0 
 
10.0 
 
0.0 
 
Difference 
 
10.0** 
 
16.7** 
 
6.7* 
 
 
 
Index level  
 
   
At time of crisis  
 
In the next 6 months   
 
 
12 months later 
 
Emerging 
market 
economies 
 
4.9 
 
4.5 
 
4.3 
 
Developed 
economies 
 
15.0 
 
14.9 
 
14.9 
 
Difference 
 
–10.1** 
 
–10.4** 
 
–10.6** 
 
 
 
Size of downgrade  
(percentage change)  
 
 
 
In the 6 months 
following the crisis  
 
In the next 6 months 
 
In the 12 months following 
the crisis 
 
Emerging 
market 
economies 
 
8.2 
 
4.4 
 
12.2 
 
Developed 
economies 
 
0.7 
 
0.0 
 
0.7 
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Difference 7.5** 4.4** 11.5** 
* Significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Source: Calvo and Reinhart 2000; author’s calculations. 
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Table 7. Sovereign Credit Ratings following Currency Crises in Developed and Emerging Market 
Economies 
  
 
 
 
Institutional Investora  
 
 
  
Coefficient
 
 
Standard 
error 
 
 
 R2 
 
Developed economies 
  
–0.007
 
0.023 
 
0.01
 
Emerging market 
economies 
  
–0.08**
 
0.011 
 
0.07
 
 
 
Moody’sb  
   Coefficient
 
Standard 
error 
 
 
Pseudo R2
 
Developed economies 
  
–0.08
 
0.76 
 
0.000
 
Emerging market 
economies 
  
–0.31**
 
0.11 
 
0.060
* Significant at the 10 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Note: Independent variable is a dummy variable for currency crises.  
a. Estimation method is ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. Dependent variable is 
the six-month change in the sovereign credit rating. 
b. Estimation method is ordered probit. Dependent variable is the three-month change in the 
sovereign credit rating. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 35 
 
 
Table 8. Do Changes in Sovereign Credit Ratings Predict Currency Crises or Default? 
Institutional Investor ratings (2,195 biannual observations) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
 
 
Standard 
error 
  
 
Significance 
level 
  
 
Pseudo R2 
 
  
Currency crises     
 
Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 
definition 
 
–0.435 
 
0.540 
 
0.072 
 
0.005 
 
Frankel and Rose 
definition  
 
–0.288 
 
0.015 
 
0.059 
 
0.007 
 
Defaults 
 
–0.214 
 
0.015 
 
0.063 
 
0.011 
 
Defaults and potential 
defaults 
 
–0.161 
 
0.021 
 
0.141 
 
 0.008 
Note: Estimation method is probit with robust standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy 
variable for currency crises. Independent variable is the 12-month change in the sovereign credit 
rating one year earlier. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
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Table 9. Do Changes in Sovereign Credit Ratings Predict Currency Crises or Default? 
Moody’s ratings (4,774 monthly observations) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
  
 
Standard 
error 
 
 
Significance 
level 
  
 
Pseudo R2 
 
 
Currency crises     
 
Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 
definition 
 
–0.217 
 
0.761 
 
0.412 
 
0.001 
 
Frankel and Rose 
definition 
 
0.014 
 
1.582 
 
0.975 
 
0.000 
 
Defaults 
 
–0.197 
 
0.102 
 
0.048 
 
0.010 
 
Defaults and potential 
defaults 
 
–0.204 
 
0.180 
 
0.099 
 
0.007 
Note: Estimation method is probit with robust standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy 
variable for currency crises. Independent variable is the 12-month change in the sovereign credit 
rating one year earlier. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
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Table 10. Do Changes in Sovereign Credit Ratings Predict Currency Crises or Defaults in 
Emerging Market Economies? 
Standard and Poor’s ratings (3,742 monthly observations) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
  
 
Standard 
error 
  
 
Significance 
level 
 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
 
Currency crises     
 
Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 
definition 
 
–0.08 
 
0.091 
 
0.772 
 
0.001 
 
Frankel and Rose 
definition  
 
–0.014 
 
0.076 
 
0.721 
 
0.001 
 
Defaults 
 
–0.120 
 
0.076 
 
0.054 
 
0.011 
 
Defaults and potential 
defaults 
 
 –0.356 
 
0.170 
 
0.117 
 
 0.007 
Note: Estimation method is probit with robust standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy 
variable for currency crises. Independent variable is the 12-month change in the sovereign credit 
rating one year earlier. 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
 
 
 38 
Table 11. Performance of Institutional Investor Sovereign Credit Ratings and Economic 
Fundamentals in Predicting Crises 
 
 
Type of crisis and 
indicator 
 
Noise-to-
signal ratio 
 
 
 
 
Percentage of 
crises 
accurately 
called 
 
Difference between 
conditional and 
unconditional 
probability 
(percent)  
 
Currency crises  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Investor 
sovereign rating  
 
1.07 
 
29 
 
5.2 
 
Average of the top 5 
monthly indicators  
 
0.45 
 
70 
 
19.1 
 
Average of the top 3 
annual indicators  
 
 
0.49 
 
36 
 
15.4 
 
Debt-to-export ratio  
 
 
0.91 
 
53 
 
6.1 
 
Banking crises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Investor  
sovereign rating  
 
1.62 
 
22 
 
0.9 
 
Average of the top 5 
monthly indicators  
 
0.50 
 
72 
 
9.1 
 
Average of the top 3 
annual indicators  
 
0.41 
 
44 
 
16.3 
 
Debt-to-export ratio 
 
 
1.04 
 
56 
 
0.9 
Notes: The top 5 monthly indicators for currency crises are: the real exchange rate, banking 
crises, stock returns, exports, and M2/reserves.  Like for currency crises, for banking crises the 
top 5 monthly indicators include the real exchange rate, stock returns and exports—but output 
and the M2 multipliers completes the list.  As to the annual indicators, the current account 
balance and a percent of investment and the overall budget deficit as a percent of GDP make the 
top 3 for both currency and banking crises.  For currency crises the current account as a percent 
of GDP completes the top three, while for banking crises short-term capital inflows as a percent 
of GDP rates highly. 
Source: Author’s calculations; Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart 2000.  
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[Add note identifying the top 5 monthly and top 3 annual indicators, since they are not 
identified elsewhere?] 
